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Abstract
The United States has many banks that are small relative to large corporations and play a
limited role in corporate governance, and a well developed stock market with an associated
market for corporate control. In contrast, Japanese and German banks are fewer in number but
larger in relative size and are said to play a central governance role. Neither country has an active
market for corporate control. We extend the debate on the relative efficiency of bank- and stock
market-centered capital markets by developing a further systematic difference between the two
systems: the greater vitality of venture capital in stock market-centered systems. Understanding
the link between the stock market and the venture capital market requires understanding the
contractual arrangements between entrepreneurs and venture capital providers; especially the
importance of the opportunity to enter into an implicit contract over control, which gives a
successful entrepreneur the option to reacquire control from the venture capitalist by using an
initial public offering as the means by which the venture capitalist exits from a portfolio
investment. We also extend the literature on venture capital contracting by offering an
explanation for two central characteristics of the U.S. venture capital market: relatively rapid exit
by venture capital providers from investments in portfolio companies; and the common practice
of exit through an initial public offering.
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1. Introduction
Contrasting capital markets in the United States with those of Japan and Germany has
become a commonplace activity. The United States has a large number of comparatively small
banks that play a limited role in the governance of large corporations, and a well developed stock
market with an associated market for corporate control that figures prominently in corporate
governance. In contrast, Japanese main banks and German universal banks are few in number but
larger in size, relative to Japanese and German firms, and are said to play a central corporate
governance role in monitoring management (e.g., Aoki, 1994; Roe, 1994). Neither country has an
active market for corporate control.
Advocates of bank-centered capital markets claim that this structure fosters patient
capital markets and long-term planning, while a stock market-centered capital market is said to
encourage short-term expectations by investors and responsive short-term strategies by managers
(e.g., Edwards & Fischer, 1994; Porter, 1992). Advocates of stock market-centered systems
(e.g., Gilson, 1996) stress the adaptive features of a market for corporate control which are
lacking in bank-centered systems, and the lack of empirical evidence of short-termism.
Paralleling the assessment of the comparative merits of stock market and bank-centered
capital markets, scholars have also sought to explain how the United States, Germany, and Japan
developed such different capital markets. Recent work has stressed that the characteristics of the
three capital markets do not reflect simply the efficient outcome of competition between
institutions, in which the most efficient institutions survive. The nature of the American capital
market -- a strong stock market, weak financial intermediaries, and the absence of the close links
between banks and nonfinancial firms said to characterize the Japanese and German capital
markets -- reflects, at least in part, politics, history and path-dependent evolution, rather than

economic inevitability (e.g., Black, 1990; Gilson, 1996; Roe, 1994). Much the same seems to be
true of Germany and Japan (Hoshi, 1993; Roe, 1994).

To be sure, competitively driven

evolution hones efficiency, but institutions that emerge are shaped at critical stages by the
random hand of events and the instrumental hand of politics.
In this article, we seek to contribute to two literatures. First, we extend the debate about
the relative efficiency of bank- and stock market-centered capital markets by documenting and
explaining a second systematic difference between the two systems: the existence of a much
stronger venture capital industry in stock market-centered systems.
We define "venture capital," consistent with American understanding, as investment by
specialized venture capital organizations (which we call "venture capital funds") in high-growth,
high-risk, often high-technology firms that need capital to finance product development or
growth and must, by the nature of their business, obtain this capital largely in the form of equity
rather than debt. We exclude "buyout" financing that enables a mature firm's managers to acquire
the firm from its current owners, even though in Europe, so-called "venture capital" firms often
provide such financing -- more often, in many cases, than the financing that we call venture
capital.
Other countries have openly envied the U.S. venture capital market and have actively, but
unsuccessfully, sought to replicate it. We offer an explanation for this failure: We argue that a
well developed stock market that permits venture capitalists to exit through an initial public
offering (IPO) is critical to the existence of a vibrant venture capital market.
Understanding this critical link between the stock market and the venture capital market
requires that we understand the implicit and explicit contractual arrangements between venture
capital funds and their investors, and between venture capital funds and entrepreneurs. This

brings us to our second contribution: We extend the literature on venture capital contracting by
offering an explanation for two characteristics of the United States venture capital market. First,
we explain the importance of exit -- why venture capital providers seek to liquidate their
portfolio company investments in the near to moderate term, rather than investing for the
long-term like Japanese or German banks. Second, we explain the importance of the form of exit:
why the potential for the venture capital provider to exit from a successful start-up through an
IPO, available only through a stock market, allows venture capital providers to enter into implicit
contracts with entrepreneurs concerning future control of startup firms, in a way not available in
a bank-centered capital market. Thus, we make explicit a functional link between private and
public equity markets:

The implicit contract over future control that is permitted by the

availability of exit through an IPO helps to explain the greater success of venture capital as an
organizational form in stock market-centered systems.
Section 2 of this article motivates the theoretical analysis by contrasting the venture
capital markets in the United States and Germany. Section 3 develops the importance of exit
from venture capital investments to the viability and structure of the venture capital industry.
Exit serves two key functions. First, venture capital investors specialize in providing portfolio
companies with a combination of financial capital, monitoring and advisory services, and
reputational capital. The combination of financial and nonfinancial services loses its efficiency
advantages as the portfolio company matures. Thus, recycling venture capital investors' capital
through exit and reinvestment is jointly efficient for the provider and the portfolio company.
Second, exit facilitates contracting between venture capital managers (persons with expertise in
identifying and developing promising new businesses) and providers of capital to venture capital
managers. The exit price gives capital providers a reliable measure of the venture capital

manager's skill. The exit and reinvestment cycle also lets capital providers withdraw capital from
less skilled venture capital managers or managers whose industry-specific expertise no longer
matches the nature of promising start-up firms. It supports an implicit contract under which
capital providers reinvest in the future limited partnerships of successful venture capital
managers.
Section 4 focuses on the implicit contract over control between the entrepreneur and the
venture capital fund. The potential to exit through an IPO allows the entrepreneur and the
venture capital fund to enter into a self-enforcing implicit contract over control, in which the
venture capital fund agrees to return control to a successful entrepreneur by exiting through an
IPO. This implicit contract cannot readily be duplicated in a bank-centered capital market.
Section 5 compares the predictions from our informal model to evidence about the success of
venture capital in other countries, including Canada, Great Britain, Israel, and Japan. Section 6
considers alternative explanations for the observed international patterns of venture capital
development, especially differences in legal rules. Some of these reasons may have predictive
power, but none has enough power to displace our theory as an explanation for a substantial
portion of the observed intercountry variation. Section 7 considers the implications of the
symbiosis between stock markets and venture capital markets for efforts by other countries to
expand their venture capital markets. Section 8 concludes.
2. The venture capital industry in the United States and Germany
In this section, we compare the venture capital industries in the United States and
Germany in order to motivate the theory developed in sections 3 and 4, in which a stock
market-centered capital market (present in the United States but absent in Germany) is a
precondition to a substantial venture capital industry.

The United States has a much more fully developed venture capital market than
Germany. The differences are of both size and substance. The United States has a larger number
of funds and the funds themselves are larger relative to each country's economy. Substantively,
United States funds are more heavily invested in early-stage ventures and high-technology
industries, while German venture capital provides primarily later-stage financing in
lower-technology industries.
The United States venture capital market is quite large. As of the end of 1994, 591 U.S.
venture capital funds had total investments (from which the fund had not yet exited or written
off) of around $34 billion (Venture Capital Yearbook, 1995). New investment in venture capital
funds in 1996 was $6.5 billion (Figure 1). In recent years, venture capital-backed firms have
raised several billion dollars annually through IPOs, including a 1996 total of $12 billion; they
form a significant portion of the total IPO market (Venture Capital Yearbook, various years
through 1997; Brav & Gompers, 1997).2 Between 1991 and 1996, there were 1,059 venture
capital- backed IPOs, an average of over 175 per year (see Table 1), as well as 466 exits through
acquisition of the venture-capital-backed firm.
Table 1. VC-backed IPOs, Public Acquisitions, and Private Acquisitions
Number of initial public offerings of venture-capital-backed companies and number of sales of
venture-capital-backed companies, between 1984 and 1996.
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An alternate way to measure the importance of venture-capital-backed IPOs is to measure the firms' market
capitalization rather than the amount of funds raised in the IPO. The 276 venture-capital-backed firms taken public
in 1996 had a mean market capitalization of $209 million and total market capitalization of $58 billion (Venture
Capital Journal, April, 1997).
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Source: Venture Capital Journal (various dates) (data for acquisitions of already public companies was available
only through 1993)

Figure 1 shows the annual variation in the number of venture-capital-backed IPOs, as well
as the amount of new capital committed to venture capital funds. Inspection of figure 1 suggests
a correlation between the availability of exit through IPO (proxied by the number of
venture-capital-backed IPOs) and investor willingness to invest in venture capital funds
(measured by new capital commitments), with perhaps a one-year lag between a change in the
number of IPOs and a resulting change in the amount of capital committed. This correlation is
consistent with the theory developed below on the link between the stock market and the venture
capital market.
Figure 1. Venture-capital-backed IPOs and new capital commitments to venture capital
funds
Number of initial public offerings of venture-capital-backed companies (left-hand scale), and
amount of new capital commitments to venture capital funds (right-hand scale), between 1978 and
1996.
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Source: Venture Capital Journal and Venture Capital Yearbook (various dates); Economist, Mar. 29, 1997 (survey

of Silicon Valley)

The visual impression of a correlation between venture-capital-backed IPOs and new
capital commitments to venture capital funds is confirmed by a simple regression of capital
contributions in year X+1 (as a dependent variable) against number of venture-capital-backed
IPOs in year X. Regression 1 below shows that the number of IPOs in year X correlates strongly
with new capital contributions in year X+1. Regression 2 adds year as an additional possible
explanatory variable. The correlation between number of IPOs in year X and new capital
commitments in the following year remains statistically significant as a predictor of new capital
commitments in the following year. These regressions are not intended to fully capture the
factors that affect capital commitments to venture capital funds, but do confirm the visual
correlation evident from Figure 1.
Table 2.
Correlation Between Venture Capital Backed IPOs and New Capital
Commitments to Venture Capital Funds
Least-squares regression of capital contributed to venture capital funds ($ millions) in year X+1
against number of initial public offerings of venture-capital backed companies in year X. Based on
data from 1978-1996 as shown in figure 1. t-statistics in parentheses. *** (** ) (* ) =

significant at .001 (.01) (.05) level.
Dependent
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Number of
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18

70.1
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(t=0.94)

18
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Intercept
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(t=å0.93)

15.1
(t=2.17)*

Year

United States venture capital funds obtain capital from a range of sources, but pension

funds are the largest contributor. Pension funds have provided roughly 40% of the capital raised
by venture capital funds over the last 10 years or so (Table 3). In Germany, on the other hand,
banks supply the majority of venture capital commitments.

Table 3
United States and Germany
Capital Raised by Venture Capital Funds By Type of Investor
Percentage of capital raised by venture capital funds in the United States and Germany, by type of
investor, for 1992-1995.
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6

7
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9
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6
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---

---

---
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Total
Sources:
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100%
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Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften Jahrbuch [German Venture Capital Association Yearbook] (various years through
1996); Venture Capital Yearbook (various years through 1997).

Seed, startup and other early stage investments that take a company through development
of a prototype and initial product shipments to customers accounted for about 37% of new
capital invested by venture capital funds in 1994 (Table 4). Later-stage expansion financing
represented another 45% of 1994 investments. Because venture capitalists usually stage their
investments (Sahlman, 1990; Gompers 1995), most expansion financing goes to companies that
received early- stage financing. Thus, the bulk of venture capital investments go to firms that
receive venture capital financing very early in their life. Moreover, most investments go to
technology-based companies; in 1994, 68% of new investments went to these companies
(Venture Economics, 1995).
Table 4
United States and Germany
Venture Capital Disbursements by Stage of Financing
Percentage of capital disbursed by venture capital funds in the United States and Germany, by
nature of investment, for 1992-1995.

1992

1993

1994

1995

Seed

3%

7%

4%

Startup

8

7

15

Other early stage

13

10

18

Expansion

55

54

45

7

6

6

14

16

12

100%

100%

100%

Seed

1%

1%

2%

2%

Startup

6

7

8

6

United States

LBO/Acquisition
Other
Total
Germany

Expansion

45

66

54

65

LBO/Acquisition

24

25

36

18

Other

25

---

---

8

100%

100%

100%

100%

Total

Sources:
European Venture Capital Association Yearbook (1995); Bundesverband Deutsche
Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften Jahrbuch [German Venture Capital Association Yearbook] (various years through
1996); Venture Capital Yearbook (various years through 1997).

Lest venture capital be dismissed as trivial in amount, and therefore not an important
factor in comparing corporate governance systems, we note that mature firms which began with
venture capital backing assume macroeconomic significance in the U.S. economy. They play a
major, often dominant role in several important and rapidly growing sectors where the United
States is recognized as a world leader, including biotechnology (for example, Genentech and
Biogen); personal computers and workstations (for example, Apple, Compaq, and Sun
Microsystems); many personal computer components and related devices such as hard drives
and routers (for example, Seagate Technologies, Connor Peripherals, and Cisco Systems);
personal computer software (for example, Lotus Development and Harvard Graphics); and
semiconductors (for example, Intel and Advanced Micro Devices).
The German venture capital industry is a fraction of the size of the United States
industry. Only 85 venture capital organizations existed at the end of 1994, with DM 8.3 billion
($5.5 billion) in cumulative capital commitments (European Venture Capital Yearbook, 1995) and
annual investments of under $400 million. Venture capital investments were .01% of German
GDP in 1994; only one-sixth of the U.S. level. This comparison understates the difference in
venture capital activity between the two countries because the European definition of venture
capital is broader than the American definition. These organizations received the majority of
their capital from banks (55%) and insurance companies (12%). Pension funds are not a factor in

the German market because German corporate and government pension obligations are largely
unfunded.
The German venture capital industry also differs from the United States in its aversion
both to early-stage investment (Table 4) and to investment in high-technology industries
(Harrison, 1990). In 1994, only 8% of the venture capital invested went to startup companies,
and only 2% to seed financing. Technology-related investments comprised only 11% of all new
investments.
In Germany, as in the United States, exit by the venture capital fund is the norm, but the
form of exit differs. Exit through the stock market is largely unavailable, although a handful of
German venture capital-backed firms have gone public on Britain's AIM (Alternative Investment
Market). The venture capital fund's exit therefore comes principally through the company's
repurchase of the venture fund's stake (a strategy not available to the rapidly growing firms that
are the predominant recipients of venture capital financing in the United States), or through
selling the company. Table 5 shows the exit strategies employed by German venture capital
funds for 1995. Of the 12 exits through IPO, only one was in Germany; the rest were on foreign
markets.
Table 5
Exits by German Venture Capital Funds, 1995
Type of exit from portfolio companies by German venture capital funds for 1995.

Exit Type
Buyback by portfolio company
Sale of portfolio company
Block sale of venture capital fund's stake
Initial Public Offering

Number of
Firms
166
74
8
12

(IPOs on foreign stock markets)

(11)

Other
Total

4
264

Source: Bundesverband Deutsche Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften Jahrbuch [German Venture Capital Association
Yearbook] (1996)

This section has only sketched the United States and German venture capital markets.
But it demonstrates the pattern we seek to explain: the existence in the United States of a
dynamic venture capital industry centered on early stage investments in high-technology
companies and the absence of a comparable industry in Germany.
3. The importance of exit by the venture capital fund
The first step in understanding the link between the stock market and the venture capital
market involves the importance of exit by the venture capital fund from its investments. We
develop below an informal theory for why exit by venture capital providers from their successful
investments is critical to the operation of the venture capital market, both for the relationship
between a venture capital fund and its portfolio companies, and for the relationship between the
fund and its capital providers. Florida & Kenney (1990) argue that U.S. venture investors'
refusal to act as long-term investors in portfolio companies weakens United States
competitiveness. Our analysis provides an efficiency justification for exit.
The need for an exit strategy does not itself explain the distinctive properties of exit
through an IPO and, therefore, the special role of an active IPO market. We develop that
relationship in section 4.
3.1. Exit from the venture capital fund - portfolio company relationship
Venture capitalists provide more than just money to their portfolio companies. Three
additional contributions loom large (Bygrave & Timmons (1992), Barry (1994), Lerner (1995),

Gorman & Sahlman (1989)): management assistance to the portfolio company, analogous to that
provided by a management consulting firm; intensive monitoring of performance, reflecting the
incentives to monitor arising from equity ownership and the power to act using the venture
capitalist's levers of control; and reputational capital, that is, the venture capitalist's ability to
give the portfolio company credibility with third parties, similar to the role played by other
reputational intermediaries such as investment bankers.
3.1.1. Management assistance: The typical venture capital fund is a limited partnership
run by general partners who are experienced at moving companies up the development path from
the startup stage and market knowledge based on other investments in the portfolio company's
industry and related industries (Sahlman, 1990; Gompers & Lerner, 1996). With this experience,
the venture capitalist can assist a management-thin early-stage company in locating and recruiting
the management and technical personnel it needs as its business grows, and can help the company
through the predictable problems that high-technology firms face in moving from prototype
development to production, marketing, and distribution. The venture capital fund's industry
knowledge and experience with prior startup firms helps it locate managers for new startups
(Carvalho, 1996).
3.1.2.

Intensive monitoring and control: Venture capital funds have both strong

incentives to monitor entrepreneurs' performance, deriving from equity ownership. They also
receive strong control levers, disproportionate to the size of their equity investment. One control
lever results from the staged timing of venture capital investment. The initial investment is
typically insufficient to allow the portfolio company to carry out its business plan (Gompers,
1995; Sahlman, 1990). The venture capitalist will decide later whether to provide the additional
funding that the portfolio company needs. The company's need for additional funds gives its

management a performance incentive in the form of a hard constraint, analogous to the use of debt
in leveraged buyouts.3
The typical contractual arrangements between a venture capital fund and a portfolio
company provide other control levers. The venture capitalist typically receives convertible debt
or convertible preferred stock that carries the same voting rights as if it had already been
converted into common stock (Benton & Gunderson, 1993; Gompers, 1997).4 The venture
capital fund commonly receives greater board representation -- often an absolute majority of the
board -- than it could elect if board representation were proportional to overall voting power.
Board control lets the venture capital provider replace the entrepreneur as chief executive officer
if performance lags.5 Even where the venture capitalist lacks board control, the investor rights
agreement gives the venture capital provider veto power over significant operating decisions by
the portfolio company.
3.1.3. Reputational capital: Much like an investment bank underwriting an initial public
offering (Gilson & Kraakman, 1984; Booth & Smith, 1986), the venture capital fund acts as a
reputational intermediary. Venture capital financing enhances the portfolio company's credibility
with third parties whose contributions will be crucial to the company's success.

Talented

3

Gompers (1995) explains the extra control rights given to the venture capital fund as a response to adverse
selection problems in early-stage financing, where information asymmetries between the entrepreneur and the venture
capital fund are greatest.
4

The standard contractual package for an early-stage venture capital investment consists of a convertible preferred
stock purchase agreement; the portfolio company's certificate of incorporation; and an investor rights agreement. The
purchase agreement, through detailed representations and warranties, documents the portfolio company's condition at
the time of the venture capital investment. The certificate of incorporation sets out the voting and other rights of the
venture capital fund's convertible debt or preferred stock. The investor rights agreement contains the portfolio
company's ongoing obligations to the venture capital fund, including detailed negative covenants and such things as
registration rights.
5

Hellman (1995a) explains why an entrepreneur would give the venture capitalist this right: to reduce the cost
of capital, thereby increasing the share of the equity the entrepreneur retains. We discuss the reputation market
necessary to prevent the venture capitalist from misusing this power in section 4.

managers are more likely to invest their human capital in a company financed by a respected
venture capital fund, because the venture capitalist's participation provides a credible signal about
the company's likelihood of success. Suppliers will be more willing to risk committing capacity
and extending trade credit to a company with respected venture capital backers. Customers will
take more seriously the company's promise of future product delivery if a venture capitalist both
vouches for and monitors its management and technical progress. Moukheiber (1996) provides
an account of the reputational power of Kleiner, Perkins, Caufield & Byers, a leading venture
capital fund.

Later on, the venture capitalist's reputation helps to attract a high quality

underwriter for an initial public offering of the portfolio company's stock (Lerner, 1994a;
Meginson & Weiss, 1991).
The venture capital fund's proffer of its reputation to third parties who have dealings
with a portfolio company is credible because the fund is a repeat player, and has put its money
where its mouth is by investing in the portfolio company. The fund's reputation is crucial for its
own dealings with investors in its existing and future limited partnerships, with other venture
capitalists in syndicating investments in portfolio companies and in negotiating with
entrepreneurs concerning new portfolio investments (Sahlman, 1990; Lerner, 1994b). Consistent
with a reputational analysis, Brav & Gompers (1997) report that venture-capital-backed IPOs do
not suffer the long-run underperformance reported for IPOs in general.
Like a venture capitalist's provision of financial capital, its non-financial contributions are
also staged, albeit informally. A venture capitalist can choose not to make or return telephone
calls to or from a portfolio company or its suppliers, customers, or prospective employees. The
fund's power to withhold its management assistance and reputational capital reinforces its
incentive and power to monitor.

The management assistance, monitoring, and service as a reputational intermediary that a
venture capitalist provides share a significant economy of scope with its provision of capital.
This scope economy arises from a number of sources. The portfolio company must evaluate the
quality of the venture capital fund's proffered management assistance and monitoring. Similarly,
potential employees, suppliers, and customers must evaluate the credibility of the fund's explicit
and implicit representations concerning the portfolio company's future. Combining financial and
nonfinancial contributions both enhances the credibility of the information that the venture
capitalist provides to third parties and bonds the venture capitalist's promise to the portfolio
company to provide nonfinancial assistance. The venture capitalist will suffer financial loss if it
reneges on its promise of nonfinancial support.

Combining financial and nonfinancial

contributions also lets investors in venture capital funds evaluate a fund's nonfinancial
contributions by measuring its return on investment. Lin & Smith (1995) also link the venture
capitalist's financial and nonfinancial investments.

Finally, there is the customary role of

monitoring in ensuring that the portfolio company's managers do not divert to themselves some
of the company's income stream.
The non-capital inputs supplied by venture capital providers have special value to
early-stage companies. As the portfolio company's management gains its own experience, proves
its skill, and establishes its own reputation, the relative value of the venture capital provider's
management experience, monitoring, and service as a reputational intermediary declines.6 Thus,
by the time the portfolio company succeeds, the venture capital provider's nonfinancial

6

Compare Rajan's (1992) analysis of the trade-off between a bank-like lender who has the ability to monitor the
borrower's on-going performance and public investors who cannot monitor. As the borrower's quality improves, the
returns to monitoring decrease, and the most efficient capital provider shifts from a monitoring bank-like lender to a
non-monitoring investor. Diamond (1991) discusses a similar generational theory in which optimal investor type
depends on a firm's stage in its life-cycle.

contributions can be more profitably invested in a new round of early-stage companies. But
because the economies of scope discussed above link financial and nonfinancial contributions,
recycling the venture capitalist's nonfinancial contributions also requires the venture capitalist to
exit -- to recycle its financial contribution from successful companies to early-stage companies.
3.2. The exit and reinvestment cycle for venture capital funds and capital providers
The efficiency of exit for the venture capitalist-portfolio company relationship
complements a similar efficiency arising from the relationship between the venture capitalist and
the investors in its limited partnerships. The cycle of financial commitment to early-stage firms,
followed by exit from these investments, responds to three contracting problems in the venture
capitalist - capital provider relationship. First, capital providers need a way to evaluate venture
capitalists' skill, in order to decide to which managers to commit new funds. Second, capital
providers need to evaluate the risks and returns on venture capital investments relative to other
investments, in order to decide whether to invest in venture capital, and how much to invest.
Third, capital providers need to be able to withdraw funds from less successful managers, or from
managers whose industry-specific expertise no longer matches current investment opportunities.
Yet the very specialization that explains why capital providers hire venture capitalists rather
than invest directly ensures that capital providers cannot easily assess whether a venture capital
fund's ongoing investments are or are likely to become successful, or how successful they are
likely to be.
Exit by the venture capital manager from specific portfolio investments provides a
benchmark that lets capital providers evaluate both the relative skill of venture capital managers
and the profitability of venture capital relative to other investments (Gompers, 1996). At the
same time, payment of the exit proceeds to capital providers lets the capital providers recycle

funds from less successful to more successful venture capital managers.
Conventional limited partnership agreements between venture capital funds and capital
providers reflect the efficiency of exit for this relationship. The limited partnership agreement
typically sets a maximum term for the partnership of 7-10 years, after which the partnership
must be liquidated and the proceeds distributed to the limited partners (Sahlman, 1990). During
the term of the limited partnership agreement, the proceeds from investments in particular firms
are distributed to limited partners as realized. Moreover, venture capital funds have strong
incentives to exit from their investments, when feasible, well before the end of the partnership
period. A fund's performance record, based on completed investments, is the fund's principal
tool for soliciting capital providers to invest additional funds in new limited partnerships.
The explicit contract between capital providers and the venture capitalist, requiring
liquidation of each limited partnership, is complemented by an implicit contract in which capital
providers are expected to reinvest in future limited partnerships sponsored by successful venture
capital funds. The expectation of reinvestment makes it feasible for venture capital funds to
invest in developing infrastructure and expertise that will outlive the term of any one limited
partnership, and could not be justified by the returns on the modest amount of capital that a
venture capitalist without a track record can expect to raise. Figure 2 illustrates the explicit and
implicit contracts between venture capitalists and their investors.
Figure 2. Implicit and explicit contracts between venture capitalists and outside investors

[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]

In sum, exit is central to the venture capital manager's accountability to capital providers.
The efficiency of exit for the venture capital fund - capital provider relationship complements its

efficiency properties for the portfolio firm - venture capital fund relationship. Taken together,
they provide a strong rationale for exit from individual portfolio investments as a critical
component of a viable venture capital industry.
4. The availability of exit by IPO: Implicit contracting over future control
The analysis in part 3 establishes the importance of an exit strategy to the venture capital
market. But it does not differentiate between stock market-centered and bank-centered capital
markets. A stock market makes available one special type of exit -- an initial public offering. But
another exit strategy is available to venture capital funds in both bank-centered and stock-market
centered capital markets: the fund can cause the portfolio company to be sold to a larger
company. Indeed, even in the United States, venture capitalists frequently exit through sale of
the portfolio company rather than through an IPO (Table 1). A third exit option -- leveraging the
portfolio company so it can repurchase the venture capitalist's stake -- is generally not feasible
for the fast-growing, capital-consuming companies that are the typical focus for venture capital
investing in the U.S.
Exit through sale of the portfolio company is likely to be the most efficient form of exit in
some cases. For example, innovation may be better accomplished in small firms while production
and marketing may be better accomplished in large firms. In this circumstance, selling a startup
company to another firm with manufacturing or marketing expertise can produce synergy gains.
These gains can be partly captured by the startup firm through a higher exit price (Bygrave &
Timmons, 1992).
In other cases, an IPO may be the most efficient form of exit. The potential for an IPO to
provide a higher-valued exit than sale of the company must be considered plausible, given the
frequency with which this exit option is used in the United States. Viewed ex ante, venture

capital financing of firms for which exit through IPO will (or might turn out to) maximize exit
price could be a positive net present investment in a stock-market-centered capital market, but
not in a bank-centered capital market. But this difference should affect investment decisions only
at the margin. Thus, it cannot easily explain the dramatic differences between the venture capital
industries in the United States and Germany, both in size and in type of investment.
Thus, we are only part of the way towards a theory that explains the observed link
between venture capital markets and stock markets.

We have shown why venture capital

providers need an exit strategy. What remains to be shown is that the potential for exit through
IPO, even if exit often occurs through the portfolio company's sale, is critical to the development
of an active venture capital market. This part shows that the potential for exit through IPO
allows the venture capital provider and the entrepreneur to enter into an implicit contract over
future control of the portfolio company in a manner that is not readily duplicable in a
bank-centered system.
4.1. The contracting framework
In a contracting framework, the relevant time to assess the influence of an IPO's
availability (and therefore the importance of a stock market) on the operation of the venture
capital market is when the entrepreneur and venture capital provider contract over the initial
investment, not when exit actually occurs. A number of authors have modeled aspects of this
contract, including the staging of the venture capitalist's funding, which vests in the venture
capital provider the decision whether to continue the portfolio company's projects (Admanti &
Pfleiderer, 1994; Gompers, 1995), and the venture capital fund's purchase of a convertible
security both to mitigate distributional conflicts between the entrepreneur and the venture
capitalist associated with a future sale of the firm (Berglof, 1994), and to solve an adverse

selection problem among prospective entrepreneurs (Marx, 1994; Gompers, 1997). Our informal
model seeks to explain three additional characteristics of venture capital contracting: (1) the
parties' ex ante joint preference that the venture capital fund exit through an IPO; (2) how the
entrepreneur's preference that the fund use this exit strategy if it becomes available ex post is
expressed through a self-enforcing implicit contract over future control; and (3) how this implicit
contract provides the entrepreneur with incentives that are not easily duplicated if sale of the
portfolio company is the only exit option. Because the incentive properties of this contract go to
the heart of the entrepreneurial process, its availability in a stock-market-centered capital market
links the venture capital market and the stock market and can explain the absence of vigorous
venture capital in countries with bank-centered capital markets.
Our IPO exit model requires three noncontroversial assumptions: (i) the entrepreneur
places substantial private value on control over the company she starts; (ii) it is not feasible for
an untested entrepreneur to retain control at the time of the initial venture capital financing; and
(iii) it is feasible for a successful entrepreneur to reacquire control from the venture capitalist
when the venture capitalist exits. We discuss each assumption below.
A private value for control is a standard feature in venture capital models and, more
generally, in models that seek to explain the incentive properties of capital structure (Holmstrom
& Tirole, 1989; Grossman & Hart, 1988; Harris & Raviv, 1988). Moreover, for entrepreneurs,
the assumption appears to be descriptively accurate. The failure rate for startup companies is
high enough7 so that, without a large private value for control, many potential entrepreneurs
would decide not to leave a secure job to start a new company. It is also apparent that ceding to
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See Gompers (1995) (16% of portfolio companies are liquidated or go bankrupt), Barry (1994) (one-third of
venture capital investments result in losses), Sahlman (1990) (one-third of venture capital investments result in
losses). Additionally, a significant percentage of would be entrepreneurs never secure venture funding at all.

the venture capital provider the power, frequently exercised, to remove the entrepreneur from
management is a significant cost to the entrepreneur (Hellman, 1995a).
Even if entrepreneurs value control highly, they cannot demand its retention at the time
that they are seeking venture financing. The typical entrepreneur has not previously run a
startup company. Venture capitalists rationally insist on retaining control to protect themselves
against the risk that the entrepreneur won't run the firm successfully or will extract private
benefits from the firm instead of maximizing its value to all investors.
The situation changes once a startup firm has succeeded. The entrepreneur has proved
her management skill and provided some evidence that she can be trusted with other peoples'
money. Returning control to the entrepreneur could now maximize firm value. Even if not, the
value lost may be less than the entrepreneur's private value of control. The opportunity to regain
control also provides an incentive, beyond mere wealth, for the entrepreneur to devote the effort
needed for success. This possibility squarely raises the contracting problem that we address
below:

How can the venture capitalist commit, ex ante, to transfer control back to the

entrepreneur, contingent on a concept as nebulous as "success"?
4.2. The entrepreneur's incentive contract
When the entrepreneur sells an interest in her company to a venture capital fund, the
venture capitalist receives both a residual interest in the firm's value, typically in the form of
convertible preferred stock or debt and significant control rights, both explicit (for example, the
right to remove the chief executive officer) and implicit (for example, the right to decide whether
the firm can continue in business through staged funding). In return, the company and the
entrepreneur get three things. The portfolio company receives capital plus nonfinancial
contributions including information, monitoring, and enhanced credibility with third parties. This

explicit contract is illustrated in Figure 3. In addition, the entrepreneur receives an implicit
incentive contract denominated in control. The structure of this incentive contract depends on
the availability of an IPO exit strategy.
Figure 3. Implicit and explicit contracts between venture capitalist and entrepreneur

[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]

To begin with, an IPO is available to the portfolio company only when the company is
successful. Indeed, the frequency with which a venture capital fund's portfolio companies go
public is a central measure of the venture capitalist's success in the eyes of investors in venture
capital funds (Gompers, 1996).

When an IPO occurs, the entrepreneur receives two things.

Like the venture capital provider, the entrepreneur gets cash to the extent that she sells some of
her shares in the offering, plus increased value and liquidity for unsold shares. In addition, the
entrepreneur reassumes much of the control originally ceded to the venture capitalist. The
venture capitalist's percentage stake is reduced by its direct sale of shares,8 by the venture
capitalist's in- kind distribution of shares to its investors (Gompers & Lerner, 1997), and by the
company's sale of new shares in the IPO to dispersed shareholders. The now-public firm also
no longer depends on the venture capitalist for continuation decisions through staged funding; the
public equity market is available. The greater liquidity of the venture capitalist's remaining
investment after the IPO also reduces the venture capitalists' incentive to monitor (Coffee, 1991
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Over the years 1979 through 1990, lead venture capitalists sold shares in some 27% of IPOs of venture capital
backed companies. The incidence of venture capitalist sales increased to 37% in the last three years of that period.
(Lin & Smith, 1995).

discusses the tradeoff between monitoring and liquidity).9

The venture capitalist's need to

monitor the portfolio company intensively is further reduced because some of the monitoring
task will now be undertaken by stock market analysts. On average, venture capital funds reduce
their holdings of a portfolio company's shares by 28% within one year after an IPO (Barry et. al,
1990). Three years after the IPO, only 12% of lead venture capitalists retain 5% or more of the
portfolio company's shares (Lin & Smith, 1995).
Finally, and most significantly, the explicit contract between the venture capital fund and
the portfolio company ensures that important control rights that were initially given to the fund,
including guaranteed board membership and veto power over business decisions, disappear on an
initial public offering whether or not the fund sells any shares at all in the IPO. Typically, the
terms of the convertible securities held by the venture capital fund require conversion into
common stock at the time of the IPO (Gompers, 1997); the negative covenants contained in the
investor rights agreement also terminate on an IPO (Benton & Gunderson, 1993). In short, the
venture capital fund's special control rights end at the time of an IPO, leaving the fund with only
the weaker control rights attendant to substantial stock ownership.

Even this control will

diminish over time as the venture capital fund reduces its remaining stock position. Control
becomes vested in the entrepreneur, who often retains a controlling stock interest and, even if
not, retains the usual broad discretion enjoyed by chief executives of companies without a
controlling shareholder.
The opportunity to acquire control through an IPO exit if the company is successful
gives the entrepreneur a powerful incentive beyond the purely financial gains from the increased
9

The increased liquidity and the venture capitalist's ability to sell off its investment gradually after the initial
public offering is critical because the underwriter will typically limit the amount that the venture capitalist can sell
in the IPO and over the following six months lest the market draw an unfavorable inference about the portfolio
company's future value from the venture capitalist's sales (Benton & Gunderson 1993)

value of her shares in the firm. In effect, the prospect of an IPO exit gives the entrepreneur
something of a call option on control, contingent on the firm's success.
Contrast this outcome with what the entrepreneur receives when the venture capital
provider exits through sale of the portfolio company to an established company. As in an IPO,
the entrepreneur receives cash or the more liquid securities of a publicly traded acquirer. Control,
however, passes to the acquirer, even if the entrepreneur remains in charge of day-to-day
management. Thus, if an IPO exit is not available, the entrepreneur cannot be given the incentive
of a call option on control exercisable in the event of success. Exit through an IPO is possible
only in the presence of a stock market; its role in the contract between the venture capitalist and
the entrepreneur links the venture capital market and the stock market.
4.3. Feasibility of the implicit contract over control
It remains to demonstrate the feasibility of the implicit incentive contract over control and
its superiority to an explicit contract. We undertake these tasks in this and the next subsection.
The difficulty of defining success and the potential advantages of an implicit contract are
suggested by the parties' use of an implicit contract involving staged funding to handle the preIPO decision as to whether and on what terms the venture capitalist will provide additional
financing.
The feasibility problem is to specify a self-enforcing implicit contract: (i) whose terms
are clear; (ii) whose satisfaction by the entrepreneur is observable; and (iii) whose breach by the
venture capital provider would be observable and punished by the market.

Consider the

following stylized implicit contract: The entrepreneur will be deemed sufficiently successful to
exercise her call option on control and the venture capital provider will exit through an IPO, so
long as a reputable investment banker will underwrite a firm commitment offering. The need to

clearly specify the conditions under which the entrepreneur can exercise the call option on
control is met, not by defining numerical performance standards that the portfolio company must
meet, but by delegating the performance assessment to a third party. Investment bankers have an
incentive to seek out (or respond to inquiries from) portfolio companies whose performance has
been strong enough to allow a successful public offering. A central feature of the investment
banker's role in a public offering is as an information intermediary who proffers its reputation on
behalf of the portfolio company much as the venture capitalist provides credibility to the
portfolio company at an earlier stage in its development. The investment banker's internal
standards for companies it is willing to take public, made credible by its willingness to commit its
own capital and reputation to the offering, provide a self-enforcing statement of the conditions
for exercise of the entrepreneur's call option.
The second requirement, that the entrepreneur's satisfaction of the exercise conditions be
observable, is met in the same way. The investment banker's offer to take the portfolio company
public is directly observable by the venture capital provider and the entrepreneur and is credible
because the investment banker has the right incentives to honestly evaluate a portfolio company's
performance.
The final requirement, that the venture capitalist's breach of the implicit contract be
observable and punishable by the market, is also met. Observability results from the character of
the venture capital market. The universe of portfolio companies sufficiently successful to merit a
public offering is limited, as is the number of venture capital providers. Both sides of the market
are relatively concentrated, with a significant number of portfolio companies geographically
concentrated and the offices of a significant percentage of U.S. venture capital providers found
along a short strip of Sand Hill Road in Silicon Valley (Saxanian, 1994). Moreover, venture

capital funds typically specialize in portfolio companies geographically proximate to the fund's
office.10 While proximity facilitates monitoring, it also facilitates the emergence and maintenance
of a reputation market. A claim by an entrepreneur that a venture capital provider declined to
allow a portfolio company to go public when a reputable investment banker was available would
quickly circulate through the community. Finally, venture capital providers are repeat players,
who typically seek at regular intervals to raise funds for new limited partnerships, which must
then invest in new portfolio companies, before prior limited partnerships are completed
(Sahlman, 1990). In the competition to be lead venture investor in the most attractive companies,
a reputation for breaching the implicit contract for control is hardly an advantage.
The viability of reputation market constraints on venture capitalist behavior is confirmed
by another aspect of the overall venture capitalist-entrepreneur relationship.

The venture

capitalist's staged capital commitment gives the venture capitalist the option to abandon short of
providing the portfolio company sufficient funds to complete its business plan. This gives the
entrepreneur incentive to perform, gives the venture capitalist incentives to monitor, and reduces
agency costs by shifting the continuation decision from the entrepreneur to the venture capitalist.
However, this pattern, coupled with the right of first refusal with respect to future financing
typically given to the venture capitalist (Sahlman, 1990), also permits the venture capitalist to
act opportunistically.

What can the entrepreneur do if the venture capitalist opportunistically

offers to provide the second-stage financing necessary for the entrepreneur to continue at an
unfair price? The entrepreneur could seek financing from other sources, but the original venture
capitalist's right of first refusal presents a serious barrier: who would incur the costs of making a
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Lerner (1994a) reports that venture capital providers located within five miles of a portfolio company are twice
as likely to have a board representative than providers located more than 500 miles distant. The fact that in 1996,
40% of total venture capital disbursements were to portfolio companies in California (Venture Capital Yearbook,
1997) provides further evidence of venture capital provider concentration sufficient to support a reputation market.

bid when potential bidders know that a bid will succeed only when a better informed party -- the
original investor -- believes the price is too high? A reputation market can police this potential
for opportunism.11
4.4. Superiority of the implicit contract over control
An explicit contract that specifies the operating performance necessary to entitle the
entrepreneur to reacquire control is a difficult undertaking. Creating a state-contingent contract
that specifies the control consequences of the full range of possible states of the world over the
four- to ten-year average term of a venture investment, without creating perverse incentives, is a
severe challenge both to the parties' predictive powers and their drafting capabilities. It is in
precisely these circumstances that an implicit contract is likely to have a comparative advantage
over an explicit contract.
Moreover, the venture capitalist will be willing to cede control only at the time of exit,
not before. Yet a mechanical formula cannot ensure that a reputable underwriter will be willing to
take the portfolio company public. In addition, the venture capitalist must actively cooperate for
an IPO to succeed. At the same time, the venture capitalist cannot unduly "puff" the portfolio
company's prospects, because the capital markets will punish this behavior through reduced
marketability of IPOs of other portfolio companies.

Thus, a supposedly explicit contract,

defining when the entrepreneur and the venture capital fund have the right to take the portfolio
company public, cannot easily be enforced. Such a contract would be substantially implicit in
fact, even if explicit in form. Thus, it isn't surprising that entrepreneurs and venture capitalists,
for the most part, don't seek to contract explicitly over control.
Finally, the implicit/explicit dichotomy presented above oversimplifies the real world. In
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Admati & Pfleiderer (1994), who model the shift of the continuation decision to the venture capitalist, do not
address this problem.

fact, some elements of the contract over control are explicit, while others are left implicit. For
example, cessation of the venture capital fund's special control rights at the time of an IPO is
explicitly required, while the timing of the triggering event -- the IPO -- is left implicit.
Conversion of the venture capitalist's convertible securities into common stock special rights is
sometimes explicitly required if the portfolio company achieves defined financial milestones,
even without an IPO (Benton & Gunderson, 1993; Gompers, 1997). Also, consistent with the
greater importance of control earlier in a firm's life, the venture capitalist's explicit control rights
are generally stronger, the earlier the stage of the investment (Gompers, 1997).
4.5. Consistency with empirical evidence
In our model, successful entrepreneurs often prefer exit by IPO, and have the implicit
contractual right to demand this form of exit not only when it maximizes firm value compared to
the alternative of sale of the firm, but also when the entrepreneur's private value of control
outweighs the entrepreneur's loss in share value. Our model predicts that the venture capitalist's
successful exits will take place disproportionately through IPO. If so, IPO exits will be more
profitable than exits through sale of the portfolio company, by more than can plausibly be
explained by the different values available through these different forms of exit.
This prediction is confirmed. Gompers (1995) reports that venture capital funds earn an
average 60% annual return on investment in IPO exits, compared to 15% in acquisition exits; see
also Petty, Bygrave & Shulman (1994); Sagari & Guidotti (1993). MacIntosh (1996) reports that
IPO exits are more profitable in Canada as well. It is not plausible that these large differences
could arise if the venture capitalist chose in each case the exit that maximized return on
investment.
5. Evidence from other countries

We have developed an informal theory in which the success of early stage venture capital
financing of high-growth, often high-technology firms, is linked to the availability of exit through
an initial public offering.
entrepreneurs.

The weak form of the theory is that IPO exit is preferred by

This preference leads to an implicit contract over control between the

entrepreneur and the venture capitalist, in which the entrepreneur's success is rewarded by giving
the entrepreneur the option to reacquire control through an IPO exit. This theory is consistent
with the evidence discussed in part 2 of a correlation between frequency of IPO exit and amount
of new capital contributed to venture capital funds, and the evidence in section 4.5 that
successful exits occur disproportionately through IPO.
The strong form of our theory is that the entrepreneur's preference for control is strong
enough to significantly impair the development of a venture capital market in countries where exit
by acquisition is the only viable option. This section offers an informal test of the strong form of
our theory: Does the theory predict the observed success of venture capital in different countries
with different types of capital markets? We provide data on Germany and the United States in
part 2; we survey several other countries below.
5.1. Japan
We have only limited quantitative data on the size of the venture capital industry in
Japan. However, the quantitative and qualitative data that we have (primarily from Milhaupt,
1997) is consistent with our theory: Japan, with its bank-centered capital market, has relatively
little venture capital. In 1995, there were only 121 venture capital funds, of which more than half
were affiliated with banks and run by the parent bank's employees.

The employees of

bank-affiliated funds commonly rotate through jobs in the bank's venture capital affiliate and then
return to the parent bank. Thus, they are unlikely to develop the special skills needed to evaluate

high-technology investments. Another 25 Japanese venture capital funds were run by securities
firms or insurance companies.
Unlike American venture capital funds, which primarily provide equity financing,
Japanese funds, perhaps reflecting their parentage, provide funds mostly through loans. Where
American venture capital funds concentrate on high-tech businesses, and are the principal capital
source for many startup high-tech firms, Japanese venture capital firms rarely invest in
high-technology firms. Instead, they concentrate on manufacturing and services, including such
mundane investments as small shops and restaurants. As of 1995, Japanese venture capital
funds owned more than 10% of the stock of only one biotechnology company, two new
materials firms, and 12 electronics firms.
5.2. Great Britain and Other European Countries
The similarity between Germany and Japan in the weakness of their venture capital
industries strengthens the empirical support for the claim that bank-centered capital markets do
not develop a strong venture capital industry. The converse claim is that stock-market centered
capital markets can develop a strong venture capital industry. In particular, our theory predicts
that Great Britain, with its active stock market, should have comparatively strong venture capital
industries. This prediction is also supported by the evidence. British GDP is only about
two-thirds of Germany's, yet its venture capital industry is almost five times larger, measured by
cumulative capital committed (Economist, 1996); new capital commitments are comparable to the
United States as a percentage of GDP. Ireland, with its easy access to the London stock market,
also has relatively high venture capital as a percentage of GDP. Britain and Ireland are the clear
European leaders in venture capital, with everyone else far behind.
Table 6 shows new funds raised by venture capital funds in 1993 and 1994 as a

percentage of GDP. Great Britain's lead over everyone else would be greater still if the data were
classified by the venture capital fund's home country, because British-based venture capital funds
invest substantial amounts through affiliates in other European countries.
Table 6
New Capital Committed to Venture Capital Funds, 1993-1994
(percent of GDP)

New capital commitments to venture capital funds, as percent of national GNP,
for various countries between 1993 and 1994.
Country

Year

Average:
1993-1994

1993

1994

United States
Great Britain

.03%
.09

.06%
.27

Great Britain

.09

.27

.18

France

.06

.07

.06

Italy

.02

.02

.02

Germany

.01

.01

.01

Netherlands

.04

.07

.05

Spain

.03

.01

.02

Sweden

.06

.06

.06

Ireland

.04

.25

.15

Portugal

.06

.07

.06

Belgium

.04

.03

.04

Denmark

.01

.08

.04

Switzerland

.03

.02

.03

Norway

.05

.03

.04

Finland

.01

.04

.02

Iceland

.06

0

.03

Austria

0

0

0

Source: European Venture Capital Association, 1995.

.05%
.18

These data understate the relative size of the U.S. venture capital industry. European
venture capital firms are less specialized than their American counterparts and are often affiliated
with commercial banks. The European Venture Capital Association defines "venture capital" to
include leveraged buyouts and buyins, and replacement of a firm's existing financing. In contrast,
leveraged buyout firms in the United States are a distinct industry from venture capital firms;
venture capital is also distinct from non-venture private equity financing. Non-venture uses of
funds by European "venture capital" firms are substantial. For example, in Great Britain, 47% of
capital commitments in 1994 went to buyins and buyouts, and only 8% to early stage financing.
In France, 40% of venture capital comes from banks, and in 1994, 51% of funds committed went
to buyouts, buyins, and replacement financing, while only 9% went to early stage financing.
5.3. Canada
Our evidence on Canada is drawn primarily from the recent survey by MacIntosh (1996).
Canada has a relatively open IPO market -- both domestic IPOs and access to the U.S. IPO
market. Thus, our theory predicts that Canada should have a relatively active venture capital
industry. The Canadian data are difficult to interpret because of heavy government intervention
in the venture capital industry. Labor Sponsored Venture Capital Corporations (LSVCCs),
which must be formed by a labor union, receive substantial tax benefits. As a result, they
dominate the Canadian venture capital industry. These funds tend to invest more conservatively
than other venture capital funds. The largest single LSVCC fund, the Solidarite fund, is owned
by the government of Quebec.
Still, there is substantial evidence that Canadian venture capital funds, especially private
funds, play a large role in early-stage financing of high-technology Canadian firms. In 1994,
private independent funds had C$1.8 billion under management, and all Canadian venture capital

firms had C$4.5 billion under management. The latter figure is comparable to the United States
after adjusting for the size of the economy. Moreover, 25% of new capital went to early-stage
financing -- a figure similar to that for the United States, and much higher than for European and
Japanese venture capital firms. The percentage of early-stage investments is likely higher than
this for non-LSVCC funds. In Canada, as in the United States, IPO exit is common and the
highest-return exits are through IPOs.
5.4. Israel
Israel offers an interesting case study of how an existing venture capital industry can
adapt when the option of a domestic IPO is taken away through regulation. The Israeli economy
has grown rapidly during the 1990s, partly in response to deregulation of a formerly heavily
government-controlled economy. High-technology startups, often financed by venture capital
funds, have been an important element in this growth (Gourlay, 1996). Multiple elements have
contributed to the Israeli high-technology and venture capital industries, including government
guarantees against large losses by publicly traded venture capital funds in the form of a put
option on the fund's shares, government creation of incubator facilities for startup firms, and a
substantial influx in the early 1990s of immigrant scientists from Russia.
In the early 1990s, Israeli high-technology firms often went public on the Tel Aviv Stock
Exchange at a very early stage. After a stock price crash in early 1994, the Tel Aviv Stock
Exchange adopted listing rules that limited IPOs by early-stage companies. Israeli venture capital
funds have nonetheless continued to flourish by shifting their IPOs from the Tel Aviv Stock
Exchange to the NASDAQ market. Giza Group (1996) reports the results of 16 IPOs of venture
capital-backed Israeli companies from 1993 through early 1996, of which 14 were on NASDAQ,
one on the British "AIM" small-firm market, and one on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. As of

March 31, 1997, 62 Israeli companies had listed securities on NASDAQ, including 22 in 1996
alone; most were high-tech companies. The cumulative total exceeds any other country's except
Canada's, and far exceeds any other country's relative to GDP.
6. Alternative explanations for intercountry variations in venture capital
We have developed in this paper an informal theory, based on the stock market's role in
providing contracting options not available in a bank-centered capital market, that may partially
explain cross-country variations in venture capital. In this section, we evaluate briefly several
alternative explanations for the different levels of venture capital financing in stock
market-centered and bank-centered capital markets. We first consider a claim of functional
irrelevance: institutional differences between stock market-centered and bank-centered systems
do not affect economic outcomes because bank-centered systems have developed functionally
equivalent means for financing early-stage entrepreneurial activities.

We then turn to

explanations that acknowledge differences between countries in their ability to provide financing
for high-technology ventures, but assign causation differently than we do.
While our analysis here is only suggestive, differential performance between the United
States and Germany in industries where venture capital plays a significant role in the U.S.
suggests that Germany has not yet developed a functional substitute for venture capital.
Alternative explanations may account for some of this functional difference, but none appears
able to fully displace the account of cross-national differences offered here.
6.1. Institutional but not functional differences
Different methods of organizing capital markets do not necessarily dictate corresponding
functional or performance differences. For example, empirical research by Kaplan (1994a,
1994b) and Kaplan & Minton (1994) suggests that Japanese and German companies change top

management in response to poor earnings and stock price performance about as often and as
quickly as United States companies, despite the three countries' quite different corporate
governance institutions.

The similar outcomes could reflect the impact of selection on

path-dependent corporate governance systems. That three leading industrial economies change
senior management under roughly the same circumstances may reflect a selection bias. By
limiting the sample to these successful systems, we observe only systems that, within the
constraints established by their particular institutions, have solved reasonably well the central
corporate governance problem of replacing poorly performing managers (Gilson, 1996; Kaplan &
Ramseyer, 1996).
The same functional equivalence argument can be made with respect to differences in how
successful economies finance entrepreneurial activities. If other financing methods, such as bank
financing of startup companies or internalization of the entrepreneurial process by large
companies, yields the same performance as the United States' venture capital market, then the
institutional differences are historically interesting but not functionally significant.
The empirical evidence needed to assess the functional equivalence argument for
venture-capital financed industries is not available, but anecdotal evidence makes us skeptical
about functional equivalence. The United States has become a world leader in precisely those
industries, notably biotechnology and computer-related high technology, in which the venture
capital market figures centrally (Powell, 1996). Moreover, in both Europe and the United States,
large pharmaceutical companies are responding to biotechnology entrepreneurship not by funding
the entrepreneurs directly, but instead by providing later-stage financing and partnering
arrangements to entrepreneurial companies, mostly U.S.-based and originally financed through
U.S. venture capital. (Powell, 1996; Hellman, 1995b; Lerner & Merges, 1997). The result is not

functional equivalence but specialization: Different activities are allocated to different countries
on the basis of differences in their venture capital markets.
6.2. The role of pension fund financing of venture capital
In both Japan and Germany, pension funds do not invest in venture capital. In Germany,
corporate pension obligations are typically unfunded, so large private pension plans do not exist.
Japan has moderate sized corporate pension plans, but these plans are barred by law from
investing in venture capital (Milhaupt, 1997). In the United States, in contrast, the Department
of Labor in 1979 explicitly sanctioned pension fund investment in venture capital. As shown in
Table 3, pension plans now provide over 40% of total investment in U.S. venture capital funds.
Differences in pension fund size and regulation can explain part, but in our judgment only
part, of the cross-national differences in the size of the venture capital industry. Funded pension
obligations, as in the United States, as opposed to unfunded pension obligations in Germany,
dictate only who makes employee pension investments, not the investments themselves. A
company with an unfunded pension plan, in effect, incurs an unsecured debt -- its promise to
pay pensions when workers retire. The company can invest the funds thus made available in any
way it chooses, including in venture capital. German firms could also voluntarily fund their
pension obligations, as many American firms did even before ERISA established minimum
funding requirements in 1973. The pension plan could then invest in venture capital, if it so
chose.
In the U.S., the unclear legality of pension fund investments in venture capital between
1973 and 1979 sterilized this pool of investable funds. Not surprisingly, the 1979 regulatory
change resulted in a flow of funds into the previously restricted area. German firms have never
been subject to an investment restriction similar to 1973-1979 U.S. regulation.

More generally, money is the ultimate fungible commodity, and venture capital
commitments are a tiny fraction of total business investment -- in the U.S., around $5 billion
annually compared to gross investment of over $1 trillion. If there were attractive profits to be
made from venture capital investing, it seems likely that funds would be available from other
sources, even if not from pension plans. After all, the Germans and the Japanese save more than
Americans as a percentage of GDP, merely in different forms.
6.3. Differences in labor market regulation
Germany and a number of other Western European countries impose substantial
restrictions on layoffs, especially severance payment obligations. These rules impose costs on
startup businesses and thus could discourage their formation.

Variations in labor market

restrictions correlate with observed national variations in venture capital. Germany has strong
layoff protections and little venture capital. Japan has few formal restrictions on layoffs, but the
common practice by large companies of hiring only recent college graduates and promising them
lifetime employment reduces labor market mobility (Gilson & Roe, 1997). In contrast, the
United States and Britain have more flexible labor markets and more active venture capital
markets.
Labor market regulation and practices could well affect the vitality of venture capital. For
example, Gilson (1997) argues that weak enforcement of covenants not to compete is a factor in
the strength of venture capital in California; Hyde (1997) argues that the concentration of
venture-capital-backed firms in Silicon Valley both supports and depends on what he calls "high
velocity" labor markets. But labor market regulation, as a partial explanation for the vitality of
venture capital markets, seems unlikely to fully displace our explanation, based on differences in
capital markets.

Consider Germany as an example. Severance obligations build over time; they are much
less burdensome for a startup firm that fails after a few years of operation than for a mature firm
that closes a plant that has operated for decades. Moreover, unpaid severance obligations are of
little significance if a firm goes bankrupt -- they merely expand the pool of unsecured claims on
the firm's assets.
Moreover, labor market restrictions do not map perfectly onto national patterns in
venture capital activity. Canada has moderately strong labor market restrictions; Ireland and
Israel have strong restrictions comparable to West Germany's. Yet these countries also have
strong venture capital. This pattern is consistent with their access to stock markets: the London
market for Ireland; the U.S. market for Israel; and U.S. and domestic stock markets for Canada.
6.4. Cultural differences in entrepreneurship
A final explanation is cultural. Germans and Japanese could be less entrepreneurial and
less willing to risk failure than Americans, leading to lesser demand for venture capital services
(Milhaupt, 1997, discusses Japanese culture). Cultural explanations for different patterns of
economic activity are hard to evaluate. They can be partly tautological. In economically
successful countries like Germany and Japan, the forces of economic selection will cause culture
and economic institutions to become mutually supportive. Because both are endogenously
determined, observing that cultural institutions support existing economic patterns tells us
nothing about causation. For present purposes, the more interesting issue is not a static inquiry
into the current equilibrium of culture and economic institutions, but a dynamic one: how can
culture and institutions change in response to exogenous changes in the economic environment
(North, 1990, 1994). We briefly consider this issue from an instrumental perspective in section
7.

However, there is some reason for skepticism about claims of large cultural differences in
willingness to take risks. People in all countries found large numbers of businesses, most of
which fail. The empirical regularity to be explained is not why the Germans and Japanese do not
start risky new businesses, but why they do not start many high-technology businesses, with
few tangible assets on which a bank can rely for partial return of its investment. The success of
immigrant entrepreneurs in countries with strong venture capital (for example, Russian
immigrants in Israel and Asian immigrants in the United States) suggests that entrepreneurs will
emerge if the institutional infrastructure needed to support them is available. After all, Russia
and India are also not known for their cultural support of entrepreneurship. Moreover, efforts to
find large cross-cultural differences in entrepreneurship between the U.S. and Russia at the close
of the Communist period have failed, even though these two countries ought to exhibit much
larger differences than the United States, Germany, and Japan (Shiller, Boycko & Korobov, 1991,
1992).
7. Implications for venture capital in bank-centered capital markets
Exploring the implications of the link between venture capital markets and stock markets
is more complicated than the simple admonition that bank-centered capital markets should create
a stock market. That straightforward approach has been tried before and failed. For example,
France and Germany created special stock exchange segments for newer, smaller companies
during the 1980s that, by the mid-1990s, had been shuttered or marginalized (Rasch, 1994).
Nonetheless, the financial press still stresses the absence of a venture capital market as being at
the root of the European high technology sector's poor performance, particularly with respect to
Germany (e.g., Fisher, 1996a, 1996b), and three efforts are underway to try again to create stock
markets that cater to small high-technology companies. The Alternative Investment Market of

the London Stock Exchange began trading in June 1995 and now lists over 200 firms (Price,
1996). Euro NM, a consortium of the French Le Nouveau Marche', which began trading in
February, 1996, the German Neur Market, and the Belgian New Market, is scheduled to begin
full operation in 1997. Finally, EASDAQ, an exchange explicitly patterned after the U.S.
NASDAQ and of which the NASD is a part owner, opened on September 30, 1996 (Pickles,
1996). This flurry of stock market creation, taken with the explicit goal of enhancing the
European venture capital market, suggests that there may be value in exploring the normative
implications of the stock market-venture capital market link.
We begin our analysis of this link by stressing the path dependency of national capital
markets.

It is not merely a stock market that is missing in bank-centered systems.

The

secondary institutions that have developed in bank-centered systems, including the banks'
conservative approach to lending and investing, and social and financial incentives that less richly
reward entrepreneurial zeal and more severely penalize failure (See Harrison, 1990 (Germany);
Milhaupt, 1997 (Japan)), are less conducive to entrepreneurial activity than the secondary
institutions of stock market-centered capital markets.

More critically, experienced venture

capitalists, able to assess the prospects of new venture and to provide the nonfinancial
contributions that venture capitalists supply in the United States are absent, as are investment
bankers experienced in taking early-stage companies public. Neither institution will develop
quickly.

A strong venture capital market thus reflects an equilibrium of a number of

interdependent factors, only one of which is the presence of a stock market.
For example, Germany today faces a chicken and egg problem: a venture capital market
requires a stock market, but a stock market requires a supply of entrepreneurs and deals which,
in turn, require a venture capital market. In addition, German entrepreneurs who care about

future control of their company must trust venture capitalists to return control to them some
years hence and must further trust that the stock market window will be open when they are
ready to go public. The institutional design issue is how to simultaneously create both a set of
mutually dependent institutions and the trust that these institutions will work as expected when
called upon.
In such a path-dependent equilibrium, the cost of change is the guard rail that keeps us on
the path.

We remain in an equilibrium less efficient than would be possible without the

transaction costs of creating the institutions needed to support alternatives (Kohn, 1995). While
we do not aspire to offer a solution here, our analysis suggests an approach to creating the
conditions conducive to a vigorous venture capital market: avoid the problem of creating multiple
new institutions by piggybacking on another country's institutions. If this is successful, a profit
opportunity and corresponding potential for the development of local institutions will be created.
Most obviously, in the increasingly global capital market, the German venture capital
market could follow Israel's lead in relying on the United States stock market and its supporting
infrastructure. A German company that maintains accounting records in a fashion consistent
with U.S. standards -- arguably much less of a burden when done from the beginning than if
implemented by a conversion, as when Daimler-Benz listed its shares on the New York Stock
Exchange -- confronts no regulatory barrier to listing on NASDAQ, the exchange most suitable to
venture-capital-backed IPOs. At present, over 100 European companies, including one German
company, list their shares on NASDAQ.

Many of these listings represent the initial public

offering of the company's stock. With NASDAQ comes its institutional infrastructure. For
example, both Hambrecht & Quist and Robertson, Stephens & Co., leading investment bankers
for venture-capital-backed IPOs in the United States, are opening European offices and holding

conferences to introduce American venture capital funds to European entrepreneurs (Lavin,
1996). Silicon Valley law firms are also actively recruiting European IPO candidates.
The availability of this institutional infrastructure, without the costs of establishing it
from scratch, can shorten the shadow of the past and, in the medium term, induce the
development of competing local institutions. For example, in the near term, foreign venture
capitalists will likely find it profitable to hire and train locals to help them find profitable
investment opportunities. In the medium term, some of these people, once trained, will form
their own firms and compete with their former employers.
8. Conclusion
In this paper. we have examined one of the path-dependent consequences of the
difference between stock market-centered and bank-centered capital markets: the link between an
active stock market and a strong venture capital market. We have shown that economies of scope
among financial and nonfinancial contributions by venture capital providers, plus venture capital
investors' need for a quantitative measure of venture capital funds' skill, can explain the
importance of an exit strategy. Moreover, the potential for exit through an IPO, possible in a
stock-market-centered capital market, allows the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur to
contract implicitly over control, in a manner that is not easily duplicable in a bank-centered
capital market. Finally, we have suggested that the best strategy for overcoming path dependent
barriers to a venture capital market in bank-centered systems is to piggyback on the institutional
infrastructure of stock-market-centered systems.
Our model seeks to explain the importance of a possible IPO exit for a high-growth firm
financed by a venture capital fund, for which exit by the fund is desirable at a stage in the firm's
life when it is still consuming rather than generating capital. For a mature, cash-generating firm,

another exit strategy that preserves the entrepreneur's control is possible: the firm itself can buy
back the venture capital fund's stake, perhaps by borrowing the needed funds. This strategy
permits a somewhat different implicit contract over control between the fund and an
entrepreneur: if the firm is successful enough to buy out the fund, the fund will acquiesce in this
strategy even if this form of exit does not maximize the fund's return on an individual investment.
In the United States, this form of exit is associated not with venture capital funds but with
"leveraged buyout" funds. In Europe, which has a less clear distinction between venture capital
and leveraged buyouts, this form of exit is common when venture capital funds invest in
management buyouts of mature firms. We plan to explore in future work the possible extension
of our model to the leveraged buyout industry.
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Figure 1
Venture Capital-backed IPOs and New Venture
Capital Commitments
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Figure 2
Implicit and Explicit Contracts
Between Venture Capitalists and Outside Investors
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Figure 3
Implicit and Explicit Contracts
Between Venture Capitalist and Entrepreneur
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